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One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?
Substantive Equality,
Systemic Discrimination and
Pay Equity at the Supreme
Court of Canada
Fay Faraday*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, 31 years after the equality rights guarantee in the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms took effect, women won their first
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) appeal based on sex discrimination
under section 15 of the Charter.1 This historical “first” was delivered in
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et
technique de la santé et des services sociaux. 2 The Court vindicated
women’s long-standing entitlement to non-discriminatory pay at work by
striking down provisions of Quebec’s Pay Equity Act (PEA) which
allowed identified sex discrimination in pay to go unrectified. The SCC
had ruled previously on five section 15 appeals alleging sex
discrimination against women. All five claims failed. In only one did the
*

Fay Faraday is an Assistant Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. As a constitutional
and human rights litigator, she has represented clients in numerous Charter cases before the Supreme
Court of Canada. Along with co-counsel Janet Borowy, she represented the intervener coalition of
the Ontario Equal Pay Coalition, New Brunswick Pay Equity Coalition and the Women’s Legal
Education and Action Fund (LEAF) before the SCC in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du
personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018
SCC 17 (S.C.C.) and Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J.
No. 18, 2018 SCC 18 (S.C.C.). She represented the intervener Ontario Equal Pay Coalition in
Ontario Nurses’ Assn. v. Participating Nursing Homes, [2019] O.J. No. 2237, 2019 ONSC 2168
(Ont. Div. Ct.). The Author thanks Janet Borowy for decades of collaboration and Barbara Brown
for her research assistance.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
[2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17 [hereinafter “Alliance”].
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Court even find a section 15 violation before dismissing it as justifiable
under section 1 of the Charter.3 Until 2018, the only successful section 15
sex discrimination cases at the SCC had been brought by men.4 Alliance
thus marks a watershed. An unsuccessful companion pay equity appeal,
Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General),5 was
released the same day. Together the rulings plant seeds from which a
more rigorous substantive equality analysis could grow to confront
systemic discrimination. But celebration should remain tempered
because the two cases simultaneously blaze as warning signs of the
unrelentingly unresolved fractures that lie at the foundation of section 15
jurisprudence.
Three decades after its first Charter equality ruling, Law Society
British Columbia v. Andrews, 6 the SCC continues to wrestle with the
most basic equality concepts: What is the difference between formal
equality and substantive equality? What is systemic discrimination?
What is the role of section 15(2)? Can violations of women’s sex equality
rights be justified in a free and democratic society under section 1
without violating the section 28 commitment that all rights and freedoms
in the Charter are guaranteed equally to men and women?
Since Andrews, 7 the Court has made at least seven foundational
renovations to the section 15 legal test and sustained a four-year period
from 1995 to 1999 during which there was no majority position
3

Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland and Labrador Assn. of Public and
Private Employees (N.A.P.E.), [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, 2004 SCC 66 (S.C.C.) found provincial
restrictions on pay equity violated s. 15 but ruled the violation justifiable in the existing financial
circumstances. Sex discrimination cases brought by women that were dismissed at the s. 15 stage
were: Symes v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 (S.C.C.); Native Women’s Assn.
of Canada v. Canada, [1994] S.C.J. No. 93, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.); Thibaudeau v. Canada,
[1995] S.C.J. No. 42, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.); Health Services and Support - Facilities
Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.),
succeeded on the Union’s s. 2(d) Charter challenge but the s. 15 claim was dismissed in just nine
sentences (paras. 164-167). Other equality rights cases have succeeded under s. 15 in ways that
advance equality for women; however these successful cases before Alliance were argued as
discrimination based on grounds other than sex, including disability, marital status, and civil status.
4
Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1997] S.C.J. No. 26, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 358
(S.C.C.); Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 32, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835
(S.C.C.).
5
[2018] S.C.J. No. 18, 2018 SCC 18 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “CSQ”].
6
[1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.).
7
This recitation of jurisprudential about-faces is updated from my book chapter: Fay
Faraday, “Working Towards Equality” in Unions Matter: Advancing Democracy, Economic
Equality and Social Justice, Matthew Berens ed. (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2014), at 165. See
also Jennifer Koshan and Jonette Watson Hamilton, “The Continual Reinvention of Section 15 of the
Charter” (2013) 64 U.N.B.L.J. 19-53.
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whatsoever on the legal test.8 That interregnum was followed by 19 years
during which three core equality concepts were adopted by a unanimous
or majority Court, only to be explicitly rejected in very short order. 9
These reversals were then situated within a new characterization of the
relationship between sections 15(1) and 15(2) of the Charter, only to
have the Court restore the original relationship a decade later. 10 With
every section 15 case, the Court states the legal test for equality rights
with a slightly different nuance, leaving litigators and scholars alike
struggling to parse the significance, if any, of minute variations in
wording. Despite strong analysis in the 2018 majority judgments,
however, the jurisprudential restlessness threatens to continue as both
appeals were decided by narrow margins 11 in which the majority and
dissent again applied mutually incompatible understandings of the four
basic equality concepts identified above.
This perpetual instability makes equality litigation extremely
unpredictable. It also invites litigants to repeatedly contest section 15’s
core principles. The meaning of equality is thus always up for debate
which undermines social discourse about and commitment to equality as
8
In the Court’s 1995 equality rights trilogy, the nine judges between them generated three
distinct legal tests, one with a fourth variation. No test secured majority support: Egan v. Canada,
[1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.); Miron v. Trudel, [1995] S.C.J. No. 44, [1995] 2
S.C.R. 418 (S.C.C.); Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. No. 42, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.).
This discordance persisted until the Court’s unanimous decision in Law v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.), which
essentially confirmed and elaborated on the original Andrews test (Law Society British Columbia v.
Andrews, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.)).
9
In 1999 Law v. Canada, id., introduced consideration of whether “human dignity” was
violated; that concept was explicitly rejected nine years later in R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42,
2008 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”]. In 2004, Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human
Resources Development), [2004] S.C.J. No. 60, 2004 SCC 65 (S.C.C.), introduced “mirror
comparators”; that concept was explicitly rejected seven years later in Withler v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, 2011 SCC 12 (S.C.C.). In 2008, Kapp rejected the “human dignity”
test, but introduced a discrimination test focused narrowly on “stereotype and prejudice”; that test
was explicitly rejected seven years later in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, [2013] S.C.J. No. 5,
2013 SCC 5 (S.C.C.).
10
Kapp, id., introduced a framework by which “if the government relies on s. 15(2) to
defend the distinction” identified in the first step of the s. 15(1) test , “the analysis proceeds
immediately to whether the distinction is saved by s. 15(2)”: Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development) v. Cunningham, [2011] S.C.J. No. 37, 2011 SCC 37, at paras. 43-44
(S.C.C.). Ten years later, Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et
technique de la santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17, at para. 39
(S.C.C.), rejected the notion that s. 15(2) is a stand-alone defence to s. 15(1) claims.
11
Alliance was decided by a 6-3 majority. In CSQ the Court ruled 5-4 that s. 15 was
violated, but the s. 15 majority split 4-1 in ruling the violation was justified under s. 1. Ultimately,
eight judges upheld the law as constitutional.
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a fundamental right. Two government-led legal processes in the
immediate wake of Alliance and CSQ bear witness to this. Just five
months after Alliance, a federal pay equity law was introduced12 which
included provisions negating legal principles that the SCC had just
enunciated and which replicated provisions previously struck down as
unconstitutional. 13 Meanwhile, in pay equity litigation, the Ontario
Attorney General argued that reliance on the two SCC pay equity rulings
was “misplaced and unhelpful” even though they addressed substantially
the same legal issues that were at stake in Ontario.14 The federal statute’s
failure to reflect current legal principles, and the extreme formalism of
Ontario’s radically narrow approach to constitutional precedent, both
signal an abiding resistance to equality in practice. They raise serious
grounds to question whether, in a period of intensifying political
polarization, the federal and provincial governments have stopped
engaging in the “Charter dialogue” when it comes to equality rights.15
While Alliance marks one step forward in equality jurisprudence, these
subsequent government actions may mark two steps backwards for
women’s equality rights in practice.
Part II of this article provides an orientation to the socio-economic
context of the gender pay gap, the elements of that gap which are
targeted by pay equity, and the evolution of the right to equal pay for
work of equal value that is enshrined in pay equity laws.
Part III provides an overview of Alliance and CSQ. The cases,
respectively, address women’s right to an enduring remedy for systemic
sex discrimination and women’s access to pay equity remedies in femaledominated workplaces.
Part IV grapples with the enduring fault lines in the jurisprudence. In
examining the four foundational questions about formal versus
substantive equality, systemic discrimination, the role of section 15(2),
12
Pay Equity Act, being Division 14 of Budget Implementation Act 2018, No. 2, S.C. 2018,
c. 27 [hereinafter “Federal PEA”].
13
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la
santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17 (S.C.C.); Syndicat de la fonction
publique c. Québec (Procureur général), 2004 CanLII 76338 (Que. C.S.).
14
Factum of the Intervener, The Attorney General of Ontario in Ontario Nurses’
Association v. Participating Nursing Homes; Service Employees International Union Local 1 v.
Participating Nursing Homes, Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Divisional Court), Court File Nos.
362/16, 364/16, 444/16 and 445/16 at para. 68 and 95-98 (on file with the author).
15
Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and
Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing after All)” (1997) 35 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 75-124.

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY

305

and an equality lens on section 1, the article confronts the discomfort that
chafes beneath the Court’s declaration that, while cherished, equality is
“perhaps the Charter’s most conceptually difficult provision”.16 Part IV
uses Alliance and CSQ to speak to the silences in the jurisprudence —
the obdurate refusal to speak about power — that prevent a consistent
analysis of how systemic discrimination operates.
Part V examines the fragility of section 15’s protection in the face of
political resistance to the principle of substantive equality. It uses the
federal Pay Equity Act and Ontario’s litigation techniques to reflect on
this tension and its implications for section 15’s future.

II. CONTEXT: THE GENDER PAY GAP IN CANADA17
Systemic sex discrimination that suppresses women’s pay has long
been documented and condemned in Canada. As early as 1984, Rosalie
Abella J.’s landmark Equality in Employment Royal Commission Report
stated that the fact systemic sex discrimination lowers women’s pay is
“one of the few facts not in dispute in the ‘equality’ debate”. 18 Yet,
16
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999]
1 S.C.R. 497, at para. 2 (S.C.C.).
17
While this article follows the structure of pay equity legislation which speaks of
discrimination between “female-” and “male-” dominated jobs, the Author recognizes that gender is
fluid and not confined to a rigid binary of female/male. Human rights statutes in every Canadian
jurisdiction protect against discrimination based on gender identity and gender expression: see, for
example, Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 3(1); Ontario Human Rights Code,
R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, ss. 1 through 7; cf Saskatchewan Human Rights Act, 2018, S.S. 2018, c. S24.2, s. 2(1), which lists gender identity as a prohibited ground of discrimination but not gender
expression. Research is beginning to document workplace discrimination — including pay
discrimination — based on gender identity and gender expression: We’ve Got Work to Do:
Workplace Discrimination and Employment Challenges for Trans People in Ontario, 2:1 Trans
Pulse E-Bulletin (May 30, 2011); Ishani Nath, “For transgender women the pay gap is even wider”,
Macleans (February 8, 2018), online: <https://www.macleans.ca/society/for-transgender-womenthe-pay-equity-gap-is-even-wider/>. To date, however, pay equity analysis struggles to break out of
the female/male binary because the sex discrimination that results in unequal pay has been driven by
practices which, over centuries, have institutionalized the devaluation and marginalization of work
done by those who identify as women based on norms and prescribed gender roles anchored in a
female/male binary. Similarly, the statistical and socio-economic data which establish an evidencebased correlation between female-dominance of occupations and suppressed pay reflects that binary.
Parallel indepth and long-term research documenting similar correlations between occupations and
suppressed pay on other grounds — including race, Indigeneity, disability, sexual orientation, gender
identity and gender expression — has not yet been conducted, owing in large part to a lack of data
that disaggregates statistics on these grounds. A critique of the limits of this analysis is beyond the
scope of this article but warrants further examination.
18
Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella, Equality in Employment: A Royal Commission Report
(Canada: 1984), at 232.
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despite laws that have prohibited sex discrimination in pay for
generations, a large and measurable systemic gender pay gap continues
to impoverish women relative to men across the country and across the
labour market.
Various metrics are used to measure the gender pay gap between
women’s and men’s earnings. The size of the gap differs whether it is
measured by hourly pay, full-time/full-year pay or annual earnings; but
on all measures women are paid significantly less than men.19
Annual earnings provide the most realistic picture of how much less
money women have than men to meet their needs. The gender pay gap
annual earnings measure also captures the many ways that systemic sex
discrimination resonates in women’s pay, including: (a) prejudicial
treatment in hiring, training and promotions; (b) sex-based occupational
segregation; (c) devaluation of women’s skills and labour in traditional
“female” occupations; (d) women’s overrepresentation in part-time,
casual, seasonal and temporary help agency work; (e) women’s
overrepresentation in minimum wage work; (f) gender-based violence
that drives women from jobs and/or occupations; (g) barriers to
unionization which arise because generations-old labour legislation was
designed around male full-time work patterns; and (h) women’s
disproportionate burden in performing unpaid care work.20
Canada’s 2016 Census data21 on women’s and men’s annual earnings
reveal that on average, women across Canada earn 32 per cent less than
men. This gap is larger for women with disabilities (56%), immigrant
women (55%), Indigenous women (45%) and racialized women (40%).
The precise wage gap varies by province, 22 but the existence of the
gender pay gap, and its pattern of exacerbation through intersecting
forms of discrimination persists across all provinces.23 In 2019, Canada

19
See, for example, Ontario, Final Report and Recommendations of the Gender Wage Gap
Steering Committee, prepared for the Minister of Labour and Minister for Women’s Issues (2016)
[hereinafter “Gender Wage Gap Report”], at 17-18.
20
Ontario Equal Pay Coalition, Fact Sheet #1: Facts and Figures about the Gender Pay
Gap (2019).
21
These are the most current comprehensive statistics at the time of writing.
22
Alberta has the largest gender pay gap at 41 per cent: see Kathleen Lahey, Equal Worth:
Designing Effective Pay Equity Laws for Alberta (Parkland Institute, 2016), at 3.
23
Canada, Census (2016), Annual Earnings. See Sheila Block and Grace-Edward Galabuzi,
Persistent Inequality: Canada’s Colour-coded Labour Market (Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives (December 2018)) on the intersection of race and sex in suppressing wages. Their
analysis reveals an earnings hierarchy in which non-racialized men are the highest earners followed
in descending order by racialized men, non-racialized women and finally racialized women.
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has the seventh largest gender pay gap out of the 35 countries in the
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and
the second largest gender pay gap in the G7.24
The gender pay gap is pervasive. As economist Kate McInturff
revealed, “women are paid less than men in almost every occupational
category measured by Statistics Canada (469 of 500 occupations if you
want to be precise).”25 Women are paid less at every age group in the
workforce. The gap is lowest at ages 15 to 24 (18%); peaks at ages 25 to
34 (39.6%); then remains between 33 per cent and 38 per cent
throughout the rest of women’s working lives. A lifetime of suppressed
wages leads to a 34 per cent gender gap in women’s pensions.26 Women
receive a lower return on their educational investment than men as
women are paid less than men at every level of educational attainment
from high school (27%), through apprenticeship and trades (39.6%), to
undergraduate education (35%).27 Women are paid less than men at every
income decile, except for the lowest 10 per cent of earners where women
receive $190 more per year than men.28
This gender pay gap persists despite multiple legal commitments to
women’s right to discrimination-free pay. As observed by Abella J. in her
Royal Commission report:

24

OECD (2019), Gender wage gap (indicator), online: <10.1787/7cee77aa-en>. The
OECD measures the gender pay gap using the median annual earnings of women and men who work
full-time.
25
Kate McInturff, Women’s Work: What is it Worth to You? (Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives: January 1, 2016).
26
Ontario, Ministry of Labour, Closing the Gender Pay Gap: Background Paper (October
2015) [hereinafter “Ontario, Closing the Gender Pay Gap”], at 22-23. See also, Girl Guides of
Canada, Girls on the Job: Realities in Canada (2019) which partnered with Ipsos on a survey which
revealed that girls in high school earn on average $3 less per hour than boys and were streamed into
traditionally female care work. See also, Statistics Canada, Income of individuals by age group, sex
and income source, Canada, provinces and selected census metropolitan areas, Table 11-10-023901 (formerly CANSIM 206-0052); and Statistics Canada, The Economic Well-Being of Women
(2018), Catalogue 89-503-X, Tables 3a and 3b.
27
Ontario, Closing the Gender Pay Gap, id., at 22.
28
Mary Cornish, Every Step You Take: Ontario’s Gender Pay Gap Ladder (Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016). Moving through the income ladder, women faced the
following gender pay gaps at the respective deciles: the lowest 20 per cent of earners 15 per cent; in
the lowest 30 per cent of earners: 27 per cent; mid-range deciles: 25 per cent; top 10 per cent of
earners: 37 per cent gap. Meanwhile, a study of women who are CEOs and top executives of
Canadian corporations face a 32 per cent pay gap relative to their male colleagues: David
Macdonald, Double-Paned Glass Ceiling: The Gender Pay Gap at the top of Corporate Canada
(Canadian Centre of Policy Alternatives, January 2019).
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the [pay] gap persists through good times and bad times. It persists in
the face of society’s commitment to justice. It persists in defiance of the
law.29

Canada’s legal obligations to eliminate sex-based pay discrimination
exist at both the international and domestic level. In 1919, the
International Labour Organization recognized women’s right to equal
pay for work of equal value in its founding Constitution.30 As a member
of the ILO, Canada is bound by this Constitution. The ILO’s 1951 Equal
Remuneration Convention (No. 100) which elaborated on this right was
ratified by Canada in 1972.31 Canada has ratified successive international
human rights instruments — including the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 32 and the
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 33 — with increasingly
prescriptive directions exhorting governments to take positive action,
including legislative action, to achieve equal pay for work of equal value.
In 1998, the ILO declared women’s right to equal pay for work of equal
value one of its eight Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.34
These international human rights commitments 35 have influenced
Canada’s legislative action toward increasingly proactive obligations to
29

Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella, Equality in Employment: A Royal Commission Report
(Canada: 1984), at 232.
30
International Labour Organization, Constitution (Preamble).
31
Adoption: Geneva 34th ILC Session (June 29, 1951); entry into force May 23, 1953;
ratified by Canada November 16, 1972.
32
December 18, 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force September 3, 1981; accession by
Canada December 10, 1981), at article 11 [hereinafter “CEDAW”].
33
United Nations, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China
(1995) chap. 2, resolution 1, annex 1 (Beijing Declaration) and annex II (Beijing Platform for
Action) Strategic Objectives F.1, para. 165(a), F.2, para. 166(l), F.5, para. 178(a), (k), (l).
34
International Labour Organization (General Conference, 86th Sess., Geneva, June 1998).
35
Canada has ratified numerous international instruments committing it to equal pay for
work of equal value. But the most recent UN Periodic Reviews of Canada’s compliance with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and CEDAW each expressly highlight the reviewing committee’s
concerns about the persistent gender pay gap across Canada and its exacerbated impact on
Indigenous women, racialized women and low income women; the persistence of horizontal and
vertical sex segregation of occupations; and a lack of affordable childcare that perpetuates sex
segregation of occupations, the gender pay gap and women’s continuing primary role in unpaid care
work: UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the
sixth periodic report of Canada, March 23, 2016, E/C.12/CAN/CO/6 at 5, para. 21; UN Human
Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Canada, August 11,
2016, CCPC/C/CAN/CO/6, at 2, para. C7; UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, Concluding observations on the combined eighth and ninth periodic reports of
Canada, November 25, 2016, CEDAW/C/CAN/CO/8-9, at 14, para. 38(a) and (b).
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close the gender pay gap 36 using the legal standard of “equal pay for
work of equal value”. “Pay equity” is the term of art which refers to this
specific legal standard.
In 1951, the same year ILO Convention No. 100 was adopted, Ontario
introduced the Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act — Canada’s
first statute to protect women’s right to equal pay without discrimination
based on sex. Between 1952 and 1975, the federal government and
remaining provinces followed suit. These “first wave” equal pay
guarantees — now incorporated into employment standards legislation
— protect women’s right to be paid the same as men doing substantially
the same work.
The “second wave” of protections came as provincial and federal
human rights statutes were adopted between 1962 and 1979.37 Human
rights laws give broad guarantees of equality in all aspects of
employment from advertising for jobs, through recruitment, hiring,
training, pay, benefits, promotions, harassment on the job, terminations,
and discriminatory impacts of any other terms and conditions of work.
These two statutory frameworks had limited impact on closing the
gender pay gap, however, because they require individual women to file
complaints about their circumstances. Combatting systemic wage
discrimination that permeates the labour market cannot be done
effectively one woman, one case at a time. Thus, in 1986, five years after
Canada acceded to CEDAW, provinces began introducing pay equity
statutes that mandated employers to proactively deliver equal pay for
work of equal value.38
Women in Canada remain “concentrated in industries that parallel
their traditional gender roles at more than double the rate of men”; within
industries, “women and men tend to occupy distinct occupations, with
women’s typically being at lower levels than men’s”; and across
industries women continue to work in occupations that parallel traditional
36
See the history outlined in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel
professionnel et technique de la santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17, at
paras. 6-11 (S.C.C.).
37
Territorial human rights codes were introduced later: Yukon (1987), Northwest
Territories (2002), Nunavut (2003).
38
Manitoba introduced Canada’s first proactive pay equity legislation in 1986. In 1987,
Ontario introduced the first proactive pay equity legislation that applied to both the public and
private sector and in 1992 expanded the law to become the first pay equity statute that provided
remedies for women who work in predominantly female workplaces in the broader public sector. In
1996, Quebec introduced the first statute that provided pay equity entitlements to women in femaledominated workplaces in both the public and private sector.
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gender roles of care work, education and service. 39 The proportion of
women working in the 20 most female-dominated occupations in Canada
has barely shifted in more than a generation, from 59.2 per cent in 1987 to
56.1 per cent in 2015. 40 Pay equity laws address the fact that sex
segregation by occupation and workplace is accompanied by systemic
devaluation of the work women do. As the Ontario Pay Equity Hearings
Tribunal summarized in one of Canada’s foundational pay equity rulings:
Women are paid less because they are in women’s jobs, and women’s
jobs are paid less because they are done by women. The reason is that
women’s work — in fact, virtually anything done by women — is
characterized as less valuable. In addition, the characteristics attributed
to women are those our society values less. In the workplace, the
reward (wage) is based on the characteristics the worker is perceived as
bringing to the task. … The lower the value of those characteristics, the
lower the associated wage.41

Since 1987 the SCC has recognized that discrimination arises from
the continued operation of systems that have been designed around the
interests, values and experiences of groups with greater political,
economic and social power and privilege. Whether it is intentional or not,
this systemic discrimination is frequently a product of continuing to do
things “the way they have always been done”.42
Pay equity laws identify how these unspoken assumptions and
practices operate and eliminate their discriminatory effects. They address
the impact of the sex segregation of work by comparing the wages of
women and men doing different jobs of similar value. Pay equity laws
impose proactive obligations on employers that generally track these five
steps:

39
Melissa Moyser, Women and Paid Work (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, corrected version
published March 9, 2017) [hereinafter “Moyser, Women and Paid Work”], at 22-24.
40
Moyser, Women and Paid Work, id., at 23-24 and Table 7.
41
Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Women’s College Hospital, [1992] O.P.E.D. No. 20, 3
P.E.R. 61, at para. 16-18. See also, Haldimand-Norfolk (No. 33) (1989), 1 P.E.R. 17, at para. 44
(Ont. P.E.H.T.), affd (1990), 1 P.E.R. 188 (Ont. Div. Ct.) and Marie-Therese Chicha, L'equite
salariale: mise en oeuvre et enjeux, 3è ed. (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2011), at 23.
42
See C.N.R. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] S.C.J. No. 42, at
para. 34, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, at 1138-39 (S.C.C.): “systemic discrimination in an employment
context is discrimination that results from the simple operation of established procedures … none of
which is necessarily designed to promote discrimination.” See also, British Columbia (Public
Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’
Union (B.C.G.S.E.U.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 68 (S.C.C.).
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Identify which jobs are female-dominated, maledominated or neutral in that they do not reflect a gender
predominance in present or historical incumbency or
norms.
Evaluate female-dominated and male-dominated jobs
based on their skill, effort, responsibility and working
conditions to determine, in a gender-neutral way, the
value of all jobs to the employer.
Compare the total compensation of female- and maledominated jobs of similar value.
Adjust the total compensation of female-dominated jobs
to close the pay gap where they are paid less than maledominated jobs of similar value.
Monitor compensation on an ongoing basis to ensure that
as new jobs are created, old jobs disappear and duties of
existing jobs change over time, discriminatory
devaluation of women’s work is not revived. Where pay
equity gaps re-emerge, employers must maintain pay
equity by adjusting the pay of female-dominated jobs on
an ongoing basis to close the pay equity gaps as they
arise.43

In unionized workplaces, pay equity statutes typically require that this
process be conducted with active participation of the bargaining agent. In
non-unionized workplaces, employers conduct the analysis to create a
pay equity plan but workers must be given a period to review and
challenge the employer’s analysis.
Pay equity laws epitomize the active intervention that the SCC has
recognized is necessary to “break a continuing cycle of systemic
discrimination”; “to create a climate in which both negative practices and
negative attitudes can be challenged”; and to “destroy those patterns in
order to prevent the same type of discrimination in the future.” They are
consistent with Canada’s bedrock human rights principle that systemic
discrimination requires systemic remedies.44

43
See, for example, Call-A-Service Inc. v. An Anonymous Employee, [2008] O.P.E.D. No.
11, 2008 CanLII 88827, at para. 25 (Ont. P.E.H.T.).
44
C.N.R. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] S.C.J. No. 42, at paras.
34, 40 and 44, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114, at 1138-39, 1141-43, 1145 (S.C.C.).
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III. THE QUEBEC PAY EQUITY APPEALS
Both 2018 pay equity appeals arose from challenges to Quebec’s Pay
Equity Act.45
1. CSQ: Pay Equity in Female-Dominated Workplaces
The legal challenge in CSQ was brought by unionized women —
primarily childcare workers and language interpreters — working in
traditionally female-dominated occupations in deeply sex-segregated
industries. Their workplaces had no male-dominated jobs. They argued
that by imposing a multi-year delay and denial of a remedy for sex-based
wage discrimination in female-dominated workplaces, the PEA violated
their right to equality contrary to section 15 of the Charter.
The PEA was passed in 1996. Section 1 expressed the law’s purpose
as being to “redress differences in compensation due to the systemic
gender discrimination suffered by persons who occupy positions in
predominantly female job classes.” Further, it stated that women working
in female-dominated workplaces without male-dominated jobs have the
right to pay equity using wage comparisons from outside their specific
enterprise.
The law required employers, generally, to pay out any identified pay
equity adjustments beginning in 2001. 46 But for women working in
Quebec’s over 2,000 female-dominated private sector workplaces, 47 the
PEA delayed their pay equity remedies for 11 years. Regulations
directing how to select male comparators from outside sex segregated

45
Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland and Labrador Assn. of Public and
Private Employees (N.A.P.E.), [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, 2004 SCC 66 (S.C.C.) found provincial
restrictions on pay equity violated s. 15 but ruled the violation justifiable in the existing financial
circumstances. Sex discrimination cases brought by women that were dismissed at the s. 15 stage
were: Symes v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 131, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 695 (S.C.C.); Native Women’s Assn.
of Canada v. Canada, [1994] S.C.J. No. 93, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.); Thibaudeau v. Canada,
[1995] S.C.J. No. 42, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.); Health Services and Support - Facilities
Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.),
succeeded on the Union’s s. 2(d) Charter challenge but the s. 15 claim was dismissed in just nine
sentences (paras. 164-167). Other equality rights cases have succeeded under s. 15 in ways that
advance equality for women; however these successful cases before Alliance were argued as
discrimination based on grounds other than sex, including disability, marital status, and civil status.
46
CQLR, c. E-12.001, ss. 37, 38 and 71 [hereinafter “PEA”].
47
Centrale des syndicats du Québec c. Quebec (Procureur générale), [2014] J.Q. no 9467,
2014 QCCS 4197, at para. 4 (Que. C.S.) [hereinafter “CSQ (QCCS)”].
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workplaces were not made for nine years. 48 Section 38 of the PEA
granted a further two-year grace period for employers to implement the
comparisons.49 For these women, section 38 and section 129 of the PEA
rendered pay equity a right without a remedy until 2007 and they
received no remedy for discrimination that existed before 2007. During
this entire 11-year period from 1996 to 2007, women in femaledominated workplaces had no other legal recourse for sex discrimination
in pay because the PEA prohibited them from seeking remedies under the
Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms.50
The Quebec Superior Court dismissed the section 15 Charter claim.
While acknowledging that the PEA imposed a disadvantage on women, the
Court found that “the reason [for the disadvantage] is not that women
occupy these positions but rather that the enterprises that hire them have no
predominantly male job classes to ensure comparison”.51 Accordingly, the
distinction was not based on sex but on “working in an enterprise where
there are no predominantly male job classes”; this did not qualify as an
analogous ground.52 Without citing section 15(2) of the Charter, the Court
held that government had no obligation to address pay equity. Rather than
delaying access to pay equity, section 38 should be read as establishing the
timetable to enable women to access pay equity remedies.53
The Quebec Court of Appeal issued a one-sentence ruling: “Nous
partageons entièrement l'avis du juge de première instance.”54
The Supreme Court of Canada split 5-4 on the section 15 analysis.
Five judges55 ruled that section 38 of the PEA violates section 15 of the
48
Regulation respecting pay equity in enterprises where there are no predominantly male
job classes, E-12.001, r. 2 (effective as of May 5, 2005).
49
CQLR, c. E-12.001.
50
Under s. 128 and s. 129 of Quebec’s PEA, id., jurisdiction for any sex-based pay
discrimination complaints filed after November 27, 1997, was transferred from the Human Rights
Commission to the Pay Equity Commission. In addition, s. 125 of the Quebec’s PEA amended s. 19
of the Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms, CQLR, c. C-12, such that: “Adjustments in
compensation and a pay equity plan are deemed not to discriminate on the basis of gender if they are
established in accordance with the Pay Equity Act.”
51
Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Procureur générale), [2014] J.Q. no 9467,
2014 QCCS 4197, at para. 198 (Que. C.S.). A certified English translation of the decision is included
in the materials filed by the Intervener Equality Coalition in SCC Court File #37002.
52
Id., at para. 200.
53
Id., at paras. 201-204.
54
Centrale des syndicats du Québec c. Quebec (Procureur générale), [2016] J.Q. no 1991,
2016 QCCA 424, at para. 1 (Que. C.A.).
55
Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 18,
2018 SCC 18, at paras. 22-36, per Abella J. (writing for herself and Moldaver, Karakatsanis and
Gascon JJ. ) and at paras. 154-156, per McLachlin C.J.C. (writing for herself alone) (S.C.C.).
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Charter by discriminating on the basis of sex; but four found this
justifiable under section 1. Four judges found no section 15 violation
because they held the differential treatment was based on “the lack of male
comparators in their employers’ enterprises”, not sex.56 Only McLachlin
C.J.C. found a section 15 violation that could not be justified under
section 1.57
2. Alliance: Employers’ Duty to Maintain Pay Equity
Alliance addresses employers’ duty to maintain pay equity after it is first
established. The original 1996 PEA required employers to maintain pay
equity by adjusting compensation on an ongoing basis as pay
discrimination re-emerged over time. Despite statutory deadlines for
compliance, by 2006 only 47 per cent of employers had pay equity plans
and a further 38 per cent had not even begun the pay equity process. The
Court writes: “[f]aced with this widespread non-compliance, Quebec
decided to reduce the employers’ obligation to maintain pay equity, in the
hope that doing so would lead to better compliance.”58 In 2009, amendments
replaced employers’ continuous pay equity maintenance obligation with
pay equity audits to be conducted every five years. 59 Where an audit
disclosed a discriminatory pay gap, absent proof of employer bad faith, the
remedy only adjusted women’s pay on a go-forward basis.60 Unlike pay
equity plans which are negotiated with the union, the pay equity audits were
conducted by the employer alone. The employer was required to post the
audit results but was not required to disclose the information and analysis
upon which those results were based.61
The pay equity audit and maintenance provisions affect all Quebec
workers who are subject to the PEA. Several unions jointly challenged
these provisions,62 arguing that by allowing remedies only every five years
56

Id., at paras. 119-122, per Côté J. (writing for herself and Wagner, Brown and Rowe JJ.).
Id., at paras. 157-159, per McLachlin C.J.C.
58
Id., at para. 16.
59
Pay Equity Act, CQLR, c. E-12.001, Chapter IV.1.
60
Id., s. 76.5. That payment could either be made as a lump sum, or with permission of the Pay
Equity Audit Committee could be spread over a maximum four years:Id., s. 76.5.1. Also s. 103.1, para. 2.
61
Id., s. 76.3
62
The 30 claimants included 14 individuals, numerous bargaining units of the Syndicat
canadien de la fonction publique, Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé et des
services sociaux, Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec, and Fédération
interprofessionnelle de la santé du Québec among others, along with the non-unionized worker
advocacy organization Conseil d'intervention pour lʼaccès des femmes au travail.
57
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and only on a go-forward basis, the PEA created periods during which
identified discrimination was not rectified. Further, by excluding unions
from the pay equity audits and denying access to the information and
analysis on which the audit results were based, the PEA denied the
ability to determine if the audits were valid.
The Quebec Superior Court and Quebec Court of Appeal both agreed
that by prohibiting remedies for pay discrimination that emerged during
the five years between audits and by prohibiting access to the audit
information, the PEA violated section 15 and that violation was not
justifiable under section 1.63 Both Quebec courts ruled that the PEA did
not discriminate based on sex by allowing employers to conduct pay
equity audits without union involvement. 64 The Attorney General of
Quebec appealed the decisions. The Unions cross-appealed the ruling on
unions’ exclusion from pay equity audits.
The SCC ruled 6-3 in favour of the claimants on the lack of remedy
between audits and the denial of audit information.65 They ruled, however,
that the unions “have not … discharged their onus of proving that the lack
of employee participation has a discriminatory impact in the circumstances
of this case.”66 The dissenting judges held that there was no violation of
section 15 and even if there was, “the Act as a whole should be protected
under s. 15(2).”67

IV. ONE STEP FORWARD: RECOGNIZING SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION
1. Confronting Privilege
Throughout its section 15 jurisprudence, the SCC has waxed
rhapsodic over the idea of equality, proclaiming that section 15
“reflect[s] the fondest dreams, the highest hopes and the finest
63
Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la santé des services sociaux c. Quebec
(Procureur générale), [2014] J.Q. no 319, 2014 QCCS 149, at paras. 50-56 (Que. C.S.) [hereinafter
“Alliance (QCSC)”]; Quebec (Procureur générale) c. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de
la santé et des services sociaux, [2016] J.Q. no 13251, 2016 QCCA 1659, at paras. 72-74 (Que. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Alliance (QCCA)”]. A certified English translation of the Court of Appeal decision is included
in the materials filed by the Intervener Equality Coalition in SCC Court File #37347.
64
Alliance (QCCA), id., at para. 107.
65
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la
santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17, at paras. 33-57 (S.C.C.), per
Abella J. (writing for herself and McLachlin C.J.C., Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wager and Gascon JJ.).
66
Id., at para. 60.
67
Id., at paras. 106, 107, Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ. writing jointly in dissent.
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aspirations of Canadian society.”68 At the same time, though, the Court is
less comfortable with equality as a reality, protesting that “... [t]he
difficulty lies in giving real effect to equality.” 69 This sentiment was
echoed in Binnie J.’s declaration in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v.
Newfoundland and Labrador Assn. of Public and Private Employees
(N.A.P.E.) that “[p]ay equity has been one of the most difficult and
controversial workplace issues of our times.” 70 In both Alliance and
CSQ, Côté J. firmly roots her dissenting reasons within the “difficulty”
frame, bemoaning the “almost inherent difficulty” in interpreting section
15 and reiterating Binnie J.’s complaint that pay equity is difficult.71 Yet,
these conclusory declarations of equality’s purported difficulty are
offered without explanation of — and ward off scrutiny of — what
precisely about equality makes it so difficult to understand and
implement. The protestations moreover ring hollow when the SCC
routinely deals with legally complex, high stakes appeals in criminal, tax,
transnational corporate law, amongst others, without complaining that
they are too difficult. So what is it about equality that makes the Court
squeamish?
Equality litigation is “difficult” — or more accurately gives rise to
feelings of discomfort — precisely because it confronts how law operates
as the tool that institutionalizes power and privilege in society. 72 In
judicial reasoning, the presumption of a law’s constitutionality at times is
conflated with an assumption of compliance with constitutional norms in
practice. This erases the reality and dynamics of systemic discrimination
and replaces them with the narrative that discrimination is aberrant rather
than endemic:73
68
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at para. 67 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Vriend”]. Similarly in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
[1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at para. 2 (S.C.C.): “...[t]he quest for equality expresses
some of humanity’s highest ideas and aspirations”.
69
Vriend, id., at paras. 67-68.
70
[2004] S.C.J. No. 61, 2004 SCC 66, at para. 30 (S.C.C.).
71
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la
santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17, at paras. 62-63 (S.C.C.), per Côte
J. in dissent; Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 18,
2018 SCC 18, at para. 57 (S.C.C.), per Côte J. in dissent.
72
Sheila McIntyre, “Answering the Siren Call of Abstract Formalism with the Subjects and
Verbs of Domination” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike and M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making
Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006),
at 108.
73
Fay Faraday, “Working Towards Equality” in Matthew Berens, ed., Unions Matter:
Advancing Democracy, Economic Equality and Social Justice(Toronto: Between the Lines, 2014), at 166
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Charter litigation … is premised on the notion that the baseline
experience is one of constitutional compliance that delivers security
and rights protection. The unspoken assumption is that an individual
starts with an experience of rights protection and the impugned state
action is an aberrant divergence from that presumed status of
[constitutional] security.74

From the outset, Charter equality jurisprudence has stressed that
discrimination is primarily systemic. Yet, most Charter litigation has
challenged isolated provisions in a single statute which may deny access
to a specific benefit. These cases are overwhelmingly formal equality
claims involving direct discrimination.75 This repetition reinforces formal
equality as the paradigmatic case, creating the impression that
discrimination is narrow and isolated and that only minor adjustments are
required to achieve equality. Only rare Charter claims have challenged
the structural roots of systemic discrimination and those have met with
mixed success.76 To paraphrase Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Jennifer
Koshan, while accepting substantive equality in principle, the Court
struggles to shed formal equality as the paradigmatic case which in turn
impairs the Court’s ability to grapple with systemic discrimination.77
In examining the categorical declarations that equality and pay equity
are “difficult”, then, it is important to disaggregate what is in fact
jurisprudentially complex, and what is better characterized as conceptual
dissonance or avoidance techniques that arise in legal reasoning.
74
Tracy Heffernan, Fay Faraday and Peter Rosenthal, “Fighting for the Right to Housing in
Canada” (2015) 24 JLSP 10, at 44. See also, Sonia Lawrence, “Choice, Equality and Tales of Racial
Discrimination: Reading the Supreme Court on Section 15” (2006) Articles & Book Chapters 2130.
75
See Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Jennifer Koshan, “Adverse Impact: The Supreme Court’s
Approach to Adverse Impact under Section 15 of the Charter” (2015) 19 Rev. Const. Stud. 191.
76
For example, Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.),
successfully raised a systemic challenge to the scope of human rights legislation; Eldridge v. British
Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.), successfully
addressed systemic discrimination in access to health care although a similarly systemic claim did
not succeed in Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J.
No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.). Under human rights legislation see C.N.R. v. Canada
(Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] S.C.J. No. 42, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 (S.C.C.); British
Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and
Service Employees’ Union (B.C.G.S.E.U.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
77
Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Jennifer Koshan, “Adverse Impact: The Supreme Court’s
Approach to Adverse Impact under Section 15 of the Charter” (2015) 19 Rev. Const. Stud. 191,
write with respect to adverse impact cases under s. 15: “while accepting adverse effects
discrimination in principle, [the Court] has used direct discrimination as the paradigmatic case, and
as a result, the Court’s approach has had an adverse impact on adverse effects discrimination
claims.”
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2. Advancing a Substantive Equality Analysis of Systemic
Discrimination
Justice Abella’s majority reasons in Alliance and CSQ demonstrate
that a rigorous substantive equality analysis that addresses the impact of
systemic discrimination is possible. Her reasons mark an advance in
substantive equality analysis and the role of section 15(2) of the Charter.
They also make inroads in bringing a gendered lens to section 1 analysis
that may open the way to activate section 28 of the Charter in
constitutional analysis.
(a) Systemic Discrimination78
Systemic discrimination refers to how power structures relationships
between groups in society, privileging some and marginalizing others.79
Within this power dynamic, dominant groups attach socially constructed
meaning to human traits — such as sex — and have entrenched social
systems and behaviours that institutionalize those traits as a basis on
which to unequally distribute social, economic and political rights,
material well-being, social inclusiveness and social participation. 80 As
the SCC has observed, systemic discrimination institutionalizes practices
that, through
the imbalances of power, or the discourses of dominance, such as
racism, ablebodyism and sexism, … result in a society being designed
well for some and not for others. It allows those who consider
themselves ‘normal’ to continue to construct institutions and relations
in their image … .81

78

This section integrates analysis from the Equality Coalition’s intervener facta, written by
the Author, that were filed with the Court in both Alliance and CSQ.
79
Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), at 110-12; Sheila McIntyre, “Answering the Siren Call of
Abstract Formalism with the Subjects and Verbs of Domination” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike
and M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality under
the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at 108-109.
80
Margot Young, “Blissed Out: Section 15 at Twenty” in S. McIntyre and S. Rogers, eds.,
Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Markham:
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2006), at 63-64, 68; Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella, Equality in
Employment: A Royal Commission Report (Canada: 1984), at 9-10.
81
British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. British Columbia
Government and Service Employees’ Union (B.C.G.S.E.U.), [1999] S.C.J. No. 46, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 3,
at para. 41 (S.C.C.).
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Systemic discrimination claims target the impact of practices and
systems that have been established and normalized over time within this
unequal power relationship.82 They “necessarily involve an examination
of the interrelationships between actions (or inaction), attitudes and
established organizational structures.” 83 Claims “alleging gender-based
systemic discrimination cannot be understood or assessed through a
compartmentalized view”; instead they must be “understood, considered,
analyzed and decided in a complete, sophisticated and comprehensive
way.”84
Justice Abella’s majority reasons undertake just such a comprehensive
view. They accept that systemic sex discrimination is real and identify
how it operates to create and sustain a gender pay gap which
disadvantages women. They also steadfastly maintain a systemic frame
when analyzing the impact of the impugned statutory provisions.
The majority reasons in both appeals accept that in reality there is a
“deep and persistent gap between women’s and men’s pay” 85 and that
women have been and continue to be underpaid due to systemic
discrimination which devalues women’s work socially and economically.86
Justice Abella succinctly captures the essence of systemic sex
discrimination which deprives “women of benefits routinely enjoyed by
men — namely, compensation tied to the value of their work. Men receive
this compensation as a matter of course” while women must repeatedly
“clear the specific hurdle of proving that they should be paid equally not
merely because they are equal, but because their employer acted
improperly.”87
Significantly, understanding how sex discrimination operates
systemically leads the majority to recognize that discrimination in pay
“exists in the workforce whether or not there are male comparators in a
particular workplace” and that “women in workplaces without male
82
C.N.R. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] S.C.J. No. 42, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 1114, at 1139 (S.C.C.).
83
Association of Ontario Midwives v. Ontario (Minister of Health and Long-Term Care),
[2014] O.H.R.T.D. No. 1386, 2014 HRTO 1370, at para. 33 (Ont. H.R.T.).
84
Id.
85
Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 18,
2018 SCC 18 (S.C.C.); Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et
technique de la santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17, at paras. 6-9
(S.C.C.).
86
CSQ, id., at para. 2.
87
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la
santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17, at para. 38 (S.C.C.) (emphasis in
original).
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comparators may suffer more acutely from the effects of pay inequity
precisely because of the absence of men in their workplaces”.88 In this
way the majority integrates a full understanding of how a deeply sexsegregated labour market and sex-segregated workplaces in which
female-dominated work is most devalued are the end products of the
systemic devaluation of women’s work.
As a result, the majority in CSQ easily identified that denying a pay
equity remedy to women in female-dominated workplaces was based on
sex. Access to a remedy was “expressly defined by the presence or
absence of men in the workplace” and women in female-dominated
workplaces are “the group of women whose pay has, arguably, been most
markedly impacted by their gender.” 89 In the PEA, women’s close
proximity to male work determines whether they are entitled to a remedy
for systemic sex discrimination. The more women have suffered from
systemic sex discrimination that results in deeply sex-segregated
occupations, sex-segregated workplaces, and undervaluing of women’s
work, the less they are entitled to remedies for systemic sex
discrimination.
Similarly, understanding the dynamics of systemic discrimination
enabled the majority in Alliance to recognize that systemic pay
discrimination is not simply historical but operates on a continuing
basis.90 This led the majority to recognize that the pay audit process that
provided remedies only on a go-forward basis was discriminatory
because it effectively granted an amnesty from equality compliance of up
to five years. As the Court noted, “this has the effect of making the
employer’s pay equity obligation an episodic, partial obligation.”91 But
“the Charter right to equality is not an episodic right that exists only at
designated intervals but slumbers without effect between times”. 92 It
must be protected in a continuous, enduring way and remedies for its
breach must be similarly seamless. Finally, in understanding systemic
discrimination as an ongoing pattern of behaviour, Abella J. recognized
88
Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 18,
2018 SCC 18, at paras. 8, 29, 34 (S.C.C.).
89
Id., at para. 29.
90
See, for example, Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada (Department of National
Defence), [1996] F.C.J. No. 842, 1996 CanLII 4067 (F.C.A.); Association of Ontario Midwives v.
Ontario (Minister of Health and Long-Term Care), [2014] O.H.R.T.D. No. 1386, 2014 HRTO 1370,
at para. 32 (Ont. H.R.T.).
91
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la
santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17, at para. 33 (S.C.C.).
92
Equality Coalition Factum in Alliance, at para. 15.
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that denying access to the information underpinning pay equity audits
was discriminatory because it undermines any air of reality to the
promise of equality. Access to that information was a necessary
operational pre-condition to verifying the audit and exercising any right
to challenge its results.
The majority reasons, then, mark an advance because the reality of
systemic discrimination is not merely observed once in passing but the
systemic lens remains at the forefront, shaping the entire section 15
analysis.
(b) Section 15(2)
Section 15(2) of the Charter has bedeviled equality rights jurisprudence
since the SCC’s 2008 ruling in R. v. Kapp.93 Before this, the jurisprudence
treated section 15(2) as an interpretive aid that supported the substantive
equality interpretation of section 15(1).94 Section 15(2) “reinforce[d] the
important insight” that in a social reality of systemic discrimination
“substantive equality requires positive action to ameliorate the conditions
of socially disadvantaged groups”.95
Kapp instead gave section 15(2) independent effect as a “defence” to
allegations of discrimination: “if the government can demonstrate that an
impugned program meets the criteria of s. 15(2), it may be unnecessary
to conduct a s. 15(1) analysis at all.”96 Kapp provided shelter from full
section 15 scrutiny if a government could demonstrate that the impugned
law, program or activity has an ameliorative or remedial purpose and
targets a disadvantaged group identified by enumerated or analogous
grounds. Unlike the focus on effects that informs the rest of Canada’s

93
R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41 (S.C.C.). For analysis of the Court’s s.
15(2) jurisprudence, see Sophia Moreau, “R. v. Kapp: New Directions for Section 15” (2008-2009)
40 Ottawa L. Rev. 283-298; Jena McGill, “Ameliorative Programs and the Charter: Reflections on
the Section 15(2) Landscape since R. v. Kapp” (2017) 95 Can. B. Rev. 213; Jonnette Watson
Hamilton and Jennifer Koshan, “The Supreme Court, Ameliorative Programs, and Disability: Not
Getting It” (2013) 25 Can. J. Women & L. 56; Jena McGill, “Section 15(2), Ameliorative Programs
and Proportionality Review” (2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 521-555 and Kasari Govender and C. Tess
Sheldon, R. v. Kapp (2018) 30:2 CJWL 248.
94
See, for example, Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, 2000 SCC 37 (S.C.C.).
95
See Colleen Sheppard, Study paper on litigating the relationship between equity and
equality (Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1993), at 28; Law Society British Columbia v. Andrews,
[1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at para. 34 (S.C.C.).
96
R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41, at para. 37 (S.C.C.).

322

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

equality jurisprudence,97 under section 15(2) the Court adopted an analysis
focused exclusively on the Government’s intent such that the Court would
ask if it was “rational for the state to conclude that the means chosen to
reach its ameliorative goal would contribute to that purpose”.98
Kapp and the Court’s 2011 decision in Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development) v. Cunningham 99 both interpreted section
15(2) in appeals where parties who were not beneficiaries of an
affirmative action program challenged it as being discriminatory. Had the
approach, in implementation, been constrained to circumstances
involving claims of “reverse discrimination” by privileged groups, this
may not have been problematic. But, instead, in the wake of Kapp,
section 15(2) has been raised routinely in litigation to respond to equality
rights challenges.
When used outside the context of reverse discrimination, Kapp
undermined the integrity of the division between section 15 and section 1
of the Charter. It dragged the analysis of purpose and rational connection
out of section 1 into section 15. As will be seen in addressing Côté J.’s
dissenting reasons, this heightened the stakes on the first step of the
section 15(1) test in identifying whether a “distinction” exists that needs
to be addressed under section 15.
Moreover, by allowing government to use section 15(2) to prevent
claims by beneficiaries of affirmative ameliorative programs, it
prevented those supposed beneficiaries from challenging any
discriminatory impact under those programs. As identified by Kasari
Govender and Tess Sheldon, by eliminating any analysis of the effect of
government action, this approach effectively displaced section 15 as a
rights framework and reduced it to a charitable framework in which
disadvantaged groups must accept government’s good intentions as the
complete scope of constitutional protection. 100 Apart from being a
paternalistic approach to the Charter which erodes substantive rights

97
Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 74,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 536 (S.C.C.); C.N.R. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987]
S.C.J. No. 42, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1114 (S.C.C.); Law Society British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989]
S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, at para. 37 (S.C.C.).
98
R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41, at paras. 40-51 (S.C.C.); Alberta
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham, [2011] S.C.J. No. 37, 2011 SCC 37
(S.C.C.).
99
Id.
100
Kasari Govender and C. Tess Sheldon, R. v. Kapp (2018) 30:2 CJWL 248, at 257; See
also Jena McGill, R. v. Kapp (2018) 30:2 CJWL 221 at 235-239.
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protection, that approach directly contradicted the well-established
section 15 principle that good intentions cannot save a law that has
discriminatory effects.101
The majority reasons in both pay equity appeals effectively pushed
back at this development. The 2018 rulings reinforced a commitment to
substantive equality by restoring section 15(2) to its original role as an
interpretive aid to section 15(1). The majority held that in the appeals at
issue “s. 15(2) has no application whatever”. 102 This step back to an
earlier legal position marks a step forward in understanding how power
dynamics operate in relationships marked by systemic discrimination.
The majority underscored that the purpose of section 15(2) is to “save
ameliorative programs from the charge of “reverse discrimination””.103 In
doing so, the majority aligns section 15(2) with the Court’s long-standing
dictum that “In interpreting and applying the Charter … the courts must
be cautious to ensure that it does not simply become an instrument of
better situated individuals to roll back legislation which has as its object
the improvement of the condition of less advantaged persons.”104
The majority made clear that section 15(2) is not a “stand alone
defence” for government “to any and all claims brought under s. 15(1)”;105
it is a “defence” for those who are the beneficiaries of a special program
that ameliorates systemic discrimination. Accordingly, section 15(2) can
only operate in response to “a claim from someone outside the scope of
intended beneficiaries who alleges that ameliorating those beneficiaries
discriminates against him.”106
This important recalibration should protect substantive equality by
restoring the relationship between section 15 and section 1 of the Charter
and by keeping section 15 focused in a unified way on addressing
systemic discrimination. The routine use of section 15(2) in equality
litigation reinforced a legal and public discourse in which all equality
claims are viewed as suspect while at the same time preventing analysis

101
Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 18,
2018 SCC 18, at para. 37 (S.C.C.).
102
Id.; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la
santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17, at para. 30 (S.C.C.).
103
CSQ, id., at para. 38; Alliance, id., at para. 31.
104
R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at para. 136
(S.C.C.).
105
Centrale des syndicats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2018] S.C.J. No. 18,
2018 SCC 18, at para. 39 (S.C.C.).
106
Id., at para. 38.
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of actual systemic impacts. At a practical level, reliance on section 15(2)
should cease except when invalidating “reverse discrimination” claims.
(c) Bringing a Gender Lens to Section 1
Finally, Abella J.’s reasons in Alliance take small steps towards
incorporating a gendered lens into assessing what is considered
demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society. This is
necessary to meet the Charter’s commitment in section 28 that “the rights
and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female
persons.” Section 28 is significantly understudied 107 and has to date
played a limited role in litigation.108 But if section 1 analysis does not
consider the gendered implications of justifying a breach of Charter
rights — including a breach of Charter rights other than section 15 — it
risks reintroducing and rehabilitating the discriminatory norms and
practices that were found to violate equality rights under section 15.
Without a gender lens, systemic sex discrimination will inform what is
otherwise framed as “gender neutral” deference to government, what is
considered “rational”, what is characterized as “minimal impairment”
and what is accepted as a “proportionate” balance between deleterious
and beneficial impacts. As Kerri Froc writes in her landmark thesis,
activating section 28 would keep systemic discrimination’s impact at the
forefront throughout the whole Charter analysis:
Viewing the Charter through a “gender equality lens” requires courts,
… to shift their conceptualization of gender as exclusively a matter of
inherent identity possessed by human beings upon which neutral legal
rules apply, to gender as a structure or as a relation. It means
107

See in particular Kerri A. Froc, The Untapped Power of Section 28 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Ph.D. Thesis, Queen’s University Faculty of Law (2015)
[hereinafter “Froc”]; Sonia Lawrence, “Equality’s Shield? Notes on the Promise and Peril of Section
28”, presented at the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) Colloquium, “In Pursuit
of Substantive Equality”, Toronto (September 19, 2003).
108
The significant difference a gendered lens can bring to constitutional analysis is
illustrated by Wilson J.’s analysis of self-defence in the context of intimate partner violence in R. v.
Lavallee, [1990] S.C.J. No. 36, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (S.C.C.). She wrote, at para. 38:
If it strains credulity to imagine what the ‘ordinary man’ would do in the position of a
battered spouse, it is probably because men do not typically find themselves in that
situation. Some women do, however. The definition of what is reasonable must be
adapted to circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhabited by the
hypothetical ‘reasonable man’.
See also Wilson J. in R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at para. 242
(S.C.C.).
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considering how constitutional doctrine is gendered, that is, examining
how “gender acts upon [constitutional] law: how it functions in the
context of conferring [constitutional] meanings; how it informs the
content, organization and apprehension of [constitutional and] legal
knowledge; and how it serves to legitimate [constitutional] law and
reinforce particular…outcomes,” particularly as it “consistently appears
109
not to do so.”

The impact of bringing a gender lens to or omitting it from section 1
analysis is well illustrated by contrasting Alliance with Newfoundland
(Treasury Board) v. NAPE110 the last pay equity dispute that was heard by
the SCC under the Charter.
Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland and Labrador Assn.
of Public and Private Employees (N.A.P.E.), examined provincial
legislation that eliminated three years’ worth of pay equity adjustments
that were owed to public sector employees. The SCC found that
eliminating the pay equity debt violated section 15, but then derailed
vindication of the employees equality rights by reintroducing
discriminatory norms under section 1. The section 1 ruling was based on
judicial notice and what the Court acknowledged was a “casually
introduced” record whose weakness would normally be of “serious
concern”. 111 Despite this, the Court accepted the Government’s
assessment that a financial crisis justified eliminating the pay equity
payments. The Court used disparaging language in equating a decision to
pay the equality debt to “throw[ing] other claims and priorities to the
winds”.112 It cast doubt on whether meeting Charter equality obligations
“must necessarily rank ahead of hospital beds or school rooms” without
appreciating the irony that the women staffing the hospitals at issue were
the very ones bringing the Charter claim.113 Ultimately, the Court ruled
that the effect on the women, while “deeply unfortunate” was “purely
financial” and that it would merely “leave the women hospital workers
with their traditionally lower wage scales for a further three years.”114
By contrast, in Alliance, Abella J. definitively ruled that leaving
discriminatory pay in place after it has been identified perpetuates
109
Kerri A. Froc, The Untapped Power of Section 28 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Ph.D. Thesis, Queen’s University Faculty of Law (2015), at 411 (internal footnotes
omitted).
110
[2004] S.C.J. No. 61, 2004 SCC 66 (S.C.C.).
111
Id., at paras. 55-56.
112
Id., at para. 95.
113
Id.
114
Id., at para. 98 [emphasis added].
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systemic sex discrimination.115 To normalize these practices is not purely
financial but ideological in that it “makes women ‘the economy’s
ordained shock absorbers’”.116 It also feeds rather than breaks the cycle
of systemic discrimination because it
[R]einforces one of the key drivers of pay inequity: the power
imbalance between employers and female workers. By tolerating
employer decision-making that results in unfair pay for women, the
legislature sends a message condoning that very power imbalance,
further perpetuating disadvantage.117

As Abella J. wrote in her 1984 Royal Commission report:
The cost of the wage gap to women is staggering. And the sacrifice is
not in aid of any demonstrably justifiable social goal. To argue, as
some have, that we cannot afford the cost of equal pay to women is to
imply that women somehow have a duty to be paid less until other
financial priorities are accommodated. This reasoning is specious and it
is based on an unacceptable premise that the acceptance of arbitrary
distinctions based on gender is a legitimate basis for imposing negative
consequences … .118

While she didn’t make specific reference to section 28 of the Charter,
Abella J. effectively considered whether the Government’s proposed
justifications for the breach perpetuated systemic discrimination. She
found that they did. The Government argued that it reduced employers’
pay equity maintenance obligations because it sought to encourage
increased employer compliance with the law in a context where less than
half of employers have complied with their obligations. Justice Abella
voiced reservations about the Government’s alleged purpose and whether
its chosen method was rationally connected to that purpose, then
concluded that “the justification starts to melt away at the minimal
impairment stage”, particularly as “[l]owering the bar in the hopes of
compliance strikes me, in any event, as being inconsistent with respect for
substantive equality.”119 In applying a clear gender lens, she concluded as
follows on the final stage of the section 1 test:
115
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la
santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17, at paras. 33, 35-38 (S.C.C.).
116
Id., at para. 8.
117
Id., at paras. 38, 40.
118
Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella, Equality in Employment: A Royal Commission Report
(Canada: 1984), at 234.
119
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la
santé et des services sociaux, [2018] S.C.J. No. 17, 2018 SCC 17, at paras. 50 and 54 (S.C.C.).
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...The speculative suggestion that sacrificing that right [to pay equity]
in the hope of encouraging the possibility of better compliance, does
not outweigh the harm caused by the limitation.
Reducing employers’ obligations in the hopes of encouraging
compliance subordinates the substantive constitutional entitlement of
women to be free from discrimination in compensation to the
willingness of employers to comply with the law. It sends the policy
message to employers that defiance of their legal obligations under the
Act will be rewarded with a watering-down of those obligations. And it
sends the message to female workers that it is they who must bear the
financial burdens of employer reluctance. Any benefits of that approach
are outweighed by its harmful impact on the very people whom this pay
equity scheme was designed to help.120

This gendered lens brings an integrity and consistency to the
principles that inform the Charter analysis. This case takes a meaningful
step forward in bringing a renewed critical perspective to section 1 and it
lays the groundwork to explicitly incorporate and build on the full
implications of section 28 for Charter jurisprudence.
3. Resistance to Substantive Equality: Re-fighting Old Battles
Even while Abella J.’s majority rulings made strides on substantive
equality analysis, Côté J.’s dissenting reasons resuscitate arguments and
techniques of reasoning that have been repeatedly rejected by the SCC.
In this respect, the persistent instability at the root of equality
jurisprudence does not reflect uncertainty or complexity in the law so
much as a resistance to equality’s operation as a means of redistributing
power and rights. The dissenting reasons yield many more examples of
these avoidance techniques, but four will suffice.
First, rather than following the uncontestable principle that Charter
claims must be analyzed from the perspective of the claimant, the
dissenting reasons proceed from the perspective of the government
respondent. The dissent in Alliance begins by chastising the majority for
holding the Quebec Government to account under the Charter at all
because

120
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... Quebec has been a pioneer in the struggle against pay inequities in
private sector enterprises in Canada. … From this perspective, it is
profoundly unfair to Quebec society to claim that these amendments are
unconstitutional.121

Then rather than examining the PEA’s impact on the claimants, the
dissent decries the possibility that liability could be imposed on the
Government based on the inflated premise that the PEA would “almost
inevitably” be found disadvantageous if it fails to close the pay equity gap
“perfectly”.122 In CSQ, the dissent begins with 24 paragraphs outlining the
Government’s efforts and challenges in developing the PEA and its
associated regulation. This again anchors the analysis firmly in the
Government’s perspective and compounds the error by drawing into the
section 15 analysis a full consideration of the Government’s justifications
which properly belong only under section 1.
Second, despite giving lip service to the principle of substantive
equality, the dissent actually employs a rigid formal equality analysis that
takes place squarely within the four corners of the impugned Act.123 This
approach has been roundly rejected since 1989 on the basis that it would
lead to a “mechanical and sterile” analysis that is disconnected from an
understanding of the claimants’ location “in the entire social, political
and legal fabric of our society”.124 In CSQ, this is precisely what arose in
the dissent. Justice Côté noted that the disadvantageously affected group
“consists mostly of women” but one could not, on that basis, conclude
that the discrimination was based on sex: “to resolve this issue, we must
go further and ask what the basis for this differential treatment is.” In
going further, the dissent held that the differential treatment arises not
because of sex, but because of “the lack of male comparators in their
employers’ enterprises.”125 There is no explanation for why the dissent’s
analysis stops here. The dissent does not at this point “go further” to ask
the key question: Why is there a lack of male comparators? Had they
done so, it would have led them to the dynamics of systemic sex
121
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discrimination, which produce the sex-segregated labour market that
devalues women’s work — clearly a discriminatory dynamic based on
sex.
Third, the dissents disavow any potential government accountability for
the discriminatory impacts experienced by the claimants on the basis that
the Government did not create the economic disadvantage; it pre-existed
the PEA. The dissent takes the position that the Government could only be
found in violation of the Charter if its own actions made that pre-existing
discrimination worse. This stance contradicts the long-standing principle
that a claimant’s pre-existing disadvantage and the dynamics of systemic
discrimination which produced that disadvantage are a core part of the
contextual analysis under section 15. 126 More insidiously the dissent’s
approach treats existing systemic discrimination as an acceptable — or
natural — baseline that is immune from Charter scrutiny. Far from
eradicating existing discrimination, the dissent’s approach condones and
preserves it.
Fourth, the dissent takes the position that the choice to adopt the pay
equity audit process in the PEA was a political decision that is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Court. The dissent states categorically that this
choice “belongs to the elected representatives of Quebecers and not to
this Court.”127 The dissent raises the oft-heard and oft-rejected argument
that if legislation intended to help disadvantaged groups was subject to
Charter scrutiny it would discourage governments from addressing
disadvantage. Justice Abella in Alliance addresses the absurdity of the
dissent’s assertions as follows:
... [T]here is no evidence to support the in terrorem view advanced by
my colleagues that finding a breach would have a ‘chilling effect’ on
legislatures. That amounts to an argument that requiring legislatures to
comply with Charter standards would have such an effect. Speculative
concerns about the potential for inducing statutory timidity on the part
of legislatures has never, to date, been an accepted analytic tool for
deciding whether the Constitution has been breached. Legislatures
understand that they are bound by the Charter and that the public
expects them to comply with it. The courts are facilitators in that
enterprise, not bystanders.128
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No new ground is broken by the Court in rehearsing these battles.
Each line of argument essayed by the dissent and deflected by the
majority has been attempted and rejected in the past. But in continuing to
resist the principles and logic of substantive equality, the dissent’s
positioning seems to suggest that equality rights can somehow be
achieved without any redistribution of rights, benefits and material wellbeing. This is impossible. Meanwhile, the routine repetition of these oftrejected arguments means that those who seek to claim section 15’s
protection must, with each new case, stand ready to defend the exact
gains that have been won multiple times in the past.

V. TWO STEPS BACKWARD: WHITHER (WITHER)
CHARTER DIALOGUE?
While the majority position at the SCC makes meaningful progress in
advancing principles of substantive equality, governments seem unfazed
by the Court’s jurisprudential direction. As a result, women’s historic
Charter victory in Alliance is already under threat. Instead of a Charter
dialogue, it appears that the phone is off the hook.
First, in introducing a new proactive Pay Equity Act,129 the Federal
Government appears not to be engaging in the expected Charter dialogue
with the courts.130 The Federal PEA was introduced as part of the 884page Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 2.
Like the Quebec PEA, the Federal PEA adopts a five-year pay equity
audit cycle for maintaining pay equity. Section 88(4) appears to provide
that pay adjustments identified in the audit take effect on a go-forward
basis. Similar to Quebec, the Federal PEA amends the otherwiseapplicable Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) to prohibit women from
filing pay discrimination complaints under it.131 Despite the fact it was
introduced five months after Alliance was released, the Federal PEA
appears to replicate the precise effects that the SCC just ruled
unconstitutional. Moreover, the Federal PEA enables some employers to
decide that job evaluations that pre-date the new PEA are compliant with
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the new law.132 This lies in tension with Alliance’s holding that denying
workers the information on which to evaluate and challenge employerdeveloped pay equity violates the Charter. Moreover, comparable
provisions in Quebec’s PEA which preserved “relativity plans” that predated that province’s law were found to violate section 15 of the Charter
and were ruled unconstitutional in 2004.133 In these respects, there is a
clear breakdown of — or disregard for — communication on what is
required for Charter compliance.
The Federal PEA contains other red flags that, while not previously
ruled unconstitutional, raise meaningful concerns about prejudicial
impacts on equality rights. The new Act’s purpose clause makes the
objective of achieving pay equity subject to “the diverse needs of
employers”. Contrary to Abella J.’s section 1 reasons in Alliance, this
subordinates fundamental equality rights to employer-defined “needs”
and also undercuts the existing broad right to equality in the CHRA. The
Federal PEA contains sweeping powers by which Cabinet can make
regulations to exempt “any employer, employee or position, or any class
of employers, employees or positions, from the application of any
provision of this Act” with or without conditions.134 Other provisions in
the Act actually reduce the scope of rights protection below what
currently exists in the CHRA.135 This contradicts the basic equality rights
principle that legislative action to address equality must move the bar
forward, not back.136
These concerns are sufficiently serious that the Standing Senate
Committee on National Finance took the unusual step of passing Budget
Implementation Act, 2018, No. 2, but appending observations
specifically, and only, on the new PEA. Those observations state:
“Considering the concerns expressed by a certain number of witnesses,
your committee calls for the Government of Canada to initiate a
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parliamentary review in six years’ time at the latest” and suggested eight
specific areas of concern to be examined.137
Secondly, on the provincial front, the Attorney General for Ontario
has adopted a litigation strategy that takes an aggressively narrow
approach to the precedential value of the new SCC judgments and a
formalist analysis that effectively ignores the SCC’s systemic analysis.
Unionized nursing and service employees at 143 female-dominated
nursing homes across Ontario sought to enforce pay equity maintenance
using the external male comparators they originally used to achieve pay
equity. Without access to the external comparators, they argued, workers
in female-dominated workplaces were denied equal benefit and
protection of the maintenance provisions in the Ontario Pay Equity
Act,138 and denied a full remedy for discrimination, in violation of section
15 of the Charter. In essence, the Ontario case combines the two issues
addressed in the SCC pay equity appeals: Were women in femaledominated workplaces denied the same pay equity maintenance rights
granted to other women under the PEA? If so, does that violate section
15 of the Charter by discriminating on the basis of sex? In 2016, the Pay
Equity Hearings Tribunal denied the Unions’ applications for reasons that
mirror those of the Quebec Superior Court in CSQ. The Tribunal found
that while there was differential treatment under the PEA, the distinction
did not discriminate because it was based on women’s “locus of
employment” in a female-dominated workplace, not “sex”.139
On judicial review, the Government argued that reliance on CSQ was
“misplaced and unhelpful” because the specific mechanics by which
external comparators were identified for female-dominated workplaces
differed in the provincial statutes and because the impugned effects arose
from different distinguishing techniques (in Quebec through delay, in
Ontario through denial of access to male comparators).140 Meanwhile, the
substantive legal question in both cases was identical: whether
137
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R.S.O. 1990, c. P-7.
139
Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Participating Nursing Homes, 2016 CanLII 2675, at
paras. 119-120 and 157 (Ont. P.E.H.T.). This ruling was overturned on judicial review: Ontario
Nurses’ Assn. v. Participating Nursing Homes, [2019] O.J. No. 2237, 2019 ONSC 2168 (Ont.
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differential treatment of workers in female-dominated workplaces
discriminates contrary to section 15 of the Charter.
Similarly, even though both Alliance and Participating Nursing
Homes addressed the denial of women’s rights to pay equity
maintenance, Ontario argued that Alliance was distinguishable because
the statutory mechanisms by which maintenance operated differed under
the two provincial statutes.141 Meanwhile, the substantive legal question
to which Alliance spoke was identical: whether denial of full remedies in
the context of pay equity maintenance violated section 15 of the Charter.
Finally, in the alternative, Ontario argued that any distinction under
the Ontario PEA “is protected by section 15(2)” because the overall
purpose of the PEA is to redress systemic gender discrimination.142 This
argument tracks Côté J.’s dissents rather than Abella J.’s clear majority
holding that section 15(2) is only available to dispute “reverse
discrimination” claims which were not at issue.
Ultimately these legislative and litigation initiatives represent two
steps backwards in women’s fight for substantive equality. Charter
litigation is lengthy, resource intensive and expensive. The victory in
Alliance was hard won and the majority’s analysis robust. It should
provide strong guidance for systemic discrimination claims going
forward. But under the current political arrangements, governments’
disregard of the SCC’s jurisprudential direction and rigid formalism in
argument actively undermines women’s right to substantive equality and
poses a serious threat to women’s access to justice. As long as this
governmental resistance persists, it will encourage and fuel judicial
recalcitrance to abandon the familiar and repeatedly rejected legal
arguments reflected in the SCC dissents. Until then, we’ll be walking in
circles.
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Id., at paras. 95-98.
Id., at para. 101.

